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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STA.TE OF' UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14710

DON C. COFFEY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The defendant, Don

c.

Coffey, was convicted in the

Fourth District Court, State of Utah, of issuing a back check
in violation of Section 76-6-505, Utah Criminal Code.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On May 24, 1976, the

defendant~appellant

was tried

before a jury in Fourth District Court, the Honorable Allen
B. Sorensen presiding, and was found guilty of a second degree
felony.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant, Don

c.

Coffey, seeks vacation

of the Judgment rendered in the Fourth District Court and a
remand for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The undersigned counsel makes no particular quarrel
with the Statements of Fact appearing in the Briefs of the
Appellant and Respondent formerly filed in this matter, except
for the second paragraph of the Public Defender, Mr. John G.
Mulliner's Brief on behalf of appellant, which says:
"The check was presented for payment and was
dishonored. The Defendant did not have sufficient
funds or credit with Dixie State Bank for payment
of the check."
As will be noted hereafter, the undersigned believes
the proper state of facts were that the defendant indeed stopped
payment on the check in question, and the stipulation Of Mr.
Mulliner that appears in the record at page 6 (which also will
be referred to in detail in the argument hereafter) did not
admit that the check was presented and dishonored, but stipulated only that there were not sufficient funds or credits in
the account of the defendant on July 29, 1975, to pay the check
in question bearing the same date.

Other facts or proffered

evidence will be alluded to in the body of the argument.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S FAILURE TO OFFER AVAILABLE DEFENSES
DENIED THE DEFENDANT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL.
At the outset, it is admitted that counsel's neglect,
irrespective of motive or consequence, is ordinarily binding
upon his client.

(Attorneys at Law, 7 Arn Jur 2d 110.)

Recent

Utah cases adhere to the same rule and generally look with disfavor upon defendants who denounce their trial attorney as
incompetent:

Heinlin v. Smith, 542 P.2d 1081 (1975)1 Jara-

millo v. Turner, 465 P.2d 343, 240 Utah 2d 19 (1970)1 Lopez
v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 23, 465 P.2d 345 (1970).

In each of these

cases, however, the defendant had originally plead guilty and
sought to avoid the responsibility of his admitted act by
claiming he was not advised as to the consequences of a guilty
plea; and in each instance, the Court has viewed such claims as
abortive attempts to subvert the law.
There is language in the Jaramillo and Heinlin opinions,
for example, to the effect that a charge of incompetency is the
last refuge of the guilty and that the Court views such claims
with an implicit, if not actual, presumption in disfavor of the defendant.

But the charge in each of these cases is, as

the Court perceived, a frivolous "loophole" in light of previous
admissions the defendant had made.

In Heinlin, the defendant
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asserted the incompetence of his counsel when he failed to
move for the suppression of certain admissions made to the
taking of a consent, yet confirmed the same admissions on
the stand.

Likewise, the defendant in Jaramillo claimed his

lawyer did not advise him as to the consequences of a guilty
plea, yet the beginning of the opinion quotes portions of
the record which undeniably show that defendant's claim was a lie.
No wonder the Court has been offended by such attempts.
Nonetheless, this Court has recognized an exception
to the general rule quoted from

Am

Jur in Alires v. Turner,

22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969).

In Alires the proffered

evidence was that the petitioner had given counsel $100.00 for his
defense, but was never further contacted until sentence was imposed,
at which time counsel claimed that he did not recall receipt of
any $100.00 and turned and walked away.

The Court found that

such failure of representation was a departure from due process and remanded the case.

"The requirement" (of right to

counsel), writes the Court, "is not satisfied by a sham or
pretense of an appearance in the record by an attorney who
manifests no real concern about the interest of the accused."
Here, unlike the cases previously cited, the defendant proffered
certain facts, which if made known to a court or jury, may well
have raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

It is sub-

mitted that the case at bar falls under the same ambit as the

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Alires

case and should be remanded for the same reasons:
From the record, there is indication that the

public defender had given little, if any, preparation to the
defendant's case, and certainly had given no thought to whether
Mr. Coffey should or should not apply for adult probation once

the verdict of guilty had been rendered.

On page 21 of the

record, for example, the Court says:
"Do you have any request as to the time for
pronouncement of judgment?
Mr. Mulliner: "Your Honor, I have not discussed
this with my client. I assume that we will want a
referral to the adult probation." (Emphasis added.)
The Court: "Discuss it with him and explain to
him he has a right to have judgment pronounced in not
less that four nor more than ten days. If he wishes
if referred to the probation department, we will
require considerably more than ten days. Go ahead
and ask him. "
It seems strange that Mr. Mulliner would not discuss
the ramifications of a guilty verdict with the defendant wbefl
he made not even the slightest attempt to offer a defense.

Bad

he discussed any defense with the defendant prior to trial? 'lite
record is silent on that question.

But even a quick perusal-ef

the record leaves the reader with unresolved anxiety and C}nawi'ftt'
ambiguities:
1.

Why, for instance, did Mr. Mulliner stipulate

that as of July 29, 1975, there were not sufficient funds or
credit in the account of Don Coffey to cover the check he had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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written?

(R. P 6.)

It is submitted that such a stipulation

does not prove whether the check was, in fact, refused by the
bank (as required by the statute 76-6-505).

Neither does it

show whether there was any notice to the defendant that his
account was overdrawn, that the check would not be paid (also
as

required by the statute) or whether the defendant ever made

a subsequent deposit (Mr. Ercanbrack did, in fact, receive partial payment - R. 10.) or whether the defendant issued a stoppayment.

Had he done so, the criminal statute would no longer

be applicable.

Why were these issues never raised at trial?

Why was such a narrow and ambiguous stipulation never challenged
or clarified?

Why was the defendant never called to testify?

Why did counsel neglect to offer any evidence whatsoever as to
the conditions upon which the check was written or the reasons
why it was not paid?
2.

There were also at the time of trial significant

testimony and defenses which could have been offered, but·:were
not,

on defendant's behalf, and only remotely hinted at during

cross-examination.

It is understood that "ordinarily an appel-

lant may not raise new issues on appeal which were not
to the trial court."
~.

presen~ed

Jaramillo, 240Utah·2d 19, Holman v. Chris-

73 Utah 389, 274 Pac 457 (1929).

This court has

overlooked the rule, however, in cases like Alires , where the
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r
defendant on appeal proffered evidence in support of his claim.
Likewise, in the instant case the defendant, in reliance upon
his attorney, did not testify as he otherwise would have.
The facts as claimed by defendant are:
(a)

That Ercanbrack was told to hold the check for

a certain time until Coffey could arrange his affairs so that
the check, when deposited, would clear;
(b)

That Ercanbrack cheated the defendant by giving

him "cull" or low-grade cherries, and by reason of that breach,
was not entitled to the full amount of the check;
(c)

That Ercanbrack eventually received a partial

payment for the cherries;
(d)

That Coffey deliberately refused payment on the

balance of the original contract because he was· cheated.

The

public defender never raised any of these facts; never called
any of the witnesses which the defendant himself had arranged
to testify in court, and never contradicted the testimony of
the State's only witnesses.
3.

Other jurisdictions which have considered the

inadequacy-of-counsel issue, principally California, have
relieved a defendant from the judgment of a trial court when
counsel's lack of diligence or competence reduced the trial to
a "farce or a sham."

People v. Ibarra, 386 P.2d 287 (1963) •

In a nutshell, the context of Ibarra is that the defendant was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-7-OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

convicted of unlawful possession of heroin in the Superior
court of Los Angeles County.

Defendant appealed on the basis

that the public defender had failed to object to obviously
inadmissible evidence allegedly taken from the defendant's
person.

The failure was not, as the court so found, merely

a strategem, however

inept such a move may appear, but the

record showed that the public defender did not take the necessary preparation time to inform himself of defenses he could
and should have otherwise asserted.

Chief Justice Traynor,

in writing for the majority, held:
"Counsel's failure to research the applicable
law precluded the exercise of judgment on his part
and deprived the defendant of an adjudication of
what was clearly the stronger of the two defenses
available to him • • • Counsel's statement to the
court makes perfectly clear that his decision
reflects, not judgment, but unawareness of a rule
of law basic to the case; a rule reasonable preparation would have revealed. Counsel's failure
to object precluded resolution of the crucial
factual issues supporting defendant•s primary
evidence. It thereby reduced his trial to a
farce and a sham."
Both the Alires

and Ibarra cases use the word

"sham" in describing the trial.

In the former case, the Utah

Court remanded because counsel was unconcerned about the
interests of his client and his appearance in the reoord
amounted to a "sham and a pretense"; and in the latter case
the trial attorney's lack of preparation in failing to make
an obvious objection reduced the trial to a "farce and sham."
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It is true that the facts of the case at bar do not show a
complete failure of representation as in the Alires

case.

But the public defender's failure, in the case at bar, to
call a single defense witness, though several were available,
nor raise a single defense or even challenge the State's testimony, had the cumulative effect of denying defendant, Coffey,
fair representation to a much greater extent than

did counsel's

failure to raise a timely objection in the Ibarra case.
There is no record in this case of a defense which
could have been made, only implications that Mr. Mulliner had
done little, if anything, to prepare.
that distinction is insignificant.

We submit, however, that

In both Ibarra and the

instant case, the public defender has seriously neglected his
client's interest.

Anyone reviewing the record in Ibarra could

plainly see what the public defender should have done.

In this

case, the public defender's conduct or refusal to act is equally
demonstrated by the record, and made glaringly deficient by the
testimony proffered herein.
Counsel's neglect in the case at bar is no less serious because his proffered testimony is not explicit in the record.
Indeed, the very reason Mr. Coffey and/or any of the defense
witnesses he had scheduled did not testify was because Mr.
Mulliner had not prepared, was not familiar with the defenses
of the case and accordingly advised the defendant not to take
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the stand.

In reliance upon his attorney's advice, Mr. Coffey

made no defense, which, it is submitted, could only leave the
jury with the single and mistaken impression that no defense
was available and that the testimony of the Ercanbracks was
true.

How could the jury possibly conclude otherwise?

Even

if the points Mr. Mulliner raises in his brief are correct,
the fact remains that the defendant's trial was a farce and
a sham.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the undersigned submits that the matter should be remanded for a new
trial to permit the defendant his true day in court.
Respectfully submitted,

GORDON A. MADSEN
MAXWELL A. MILLER
MADSEN & CUMMINGS
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